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Abstract
We distinguish two sub-types of each of the two causality principles
formulated in connection with the Common Cause Principle in [Hen05]
and raise and investigate the problem of logical relations among the
resulting four causality principles. Based in part on the analysis of the
status of these four principles in algebraic quantum field theory we will
argue that the four causal principles are non-equivalent.
1 Introduction
Distinguishing and comparing carefully causality principles is important
when it comes to the question of whether a fundamental physical theory is
compatible with “causality”. Motivated to a large extent by the well-known
difficulties that stand in the way of explaining quantum (EPR) correlations
causally, Henson [Hen05] proposed two apparently different causality prin-
ciples (SO1 and SO2 in the notation of [Hen05]) and proved that the two
principles are in fact equivalent. The equivalence claim states, roughly, that
two requirements about the localizability of a common cause of a correla-
tion between causally disjoint events A and B are equivalent: localizability
within the mutual causal past of A and B (this is SO1) and localizability
within the joint causal past of A and B (this is SO2). The aim of this paper
is to distinguish further two sub-types of both SO1 and SO2 and to raise
and investigate the problem of logical relations among the resulting four
causality principles.
The need to distinguish the further types arises from the fact that the
SO1⇔ SO2 equivalence seems counterintuitive: the mutual past being part
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of the joint past, common causes localized in the mutual past are localized
in the joint past as well, hence SO1 ⇒ SO2 corresponds to our intuition;
however, the converse implication SO1⇐ SO2 does not. The intuition about
this asymmetry is supported by specific results about existence of localized
common causes in relativistic quantum field theory: The equivalence SO1
⇔ SO2 indicates that algebraic relativistic quantum field theory, which pre-
dicts correlations between observables localized in causally disjoint regions,
would satisfy the Common Cause Principle in the sense of providing causal
explanations of spacelike correlations in terms of common causes localized
in the mutual causal past of the spacelike separated spacetime regions con-
taining the correlated observables because common causes localized in the
joint pasts have been shown to exist [RS02], [RS07]. Given that no proof
of stricter localizability of common causes in algebraic quantum field theory
could be given so far, and in view of the fact that recent further investiga-
tions of the status of the common cause principle in lattice quantum field
theory seem to indicate that the two localizability conditions are not equiv-
alent [HSV12], a careful scrutiny of the equivalence claim and of its proof is
called for.
A look at the proof of the equivalence claim reveals that the crucial
feature of SO2 that the proof of the implication SO2 ⇒ SO1 is based on
is that SO2 allows to consider correlations between events associated with
“causally infinite” regions and requires such correlations to have common
causes localized in the joint past of the causally infinite regions. We will ar-
gue that this makes SO2 extremely strong and that it is both physically and
intuitively justified to distinguish such “infinite SO2” from a weaker, “finite
SO2” principle that restricts the correlations for which common causes are
required to exist to correlations between events in “causally finite” regions
(see Definition 3 for causally infinite and causally finite regions). A similar
distinction can be made in connection with SO1, and thus one has four dis-
tinct causality principles: finite and infinite SO2, on one hand, and finite
and infinite SO1 on the other. The question arises then what the relation of
these four principles are. This seems to be a difficult problem that remains
largely open. Henson proves the equivalence of infinite SO2 and infinite
SO1 —although we detect what appears a slight gap in the proof of the im-
plication [infinite SO1 ⇒ infinite SO2], see the end of Section 5. This gap
questions whether the implication [finite SO1 ⇒ finite SO2] holds, but we
do not have a counterexample to the implication. It will be shown however
that Henson’s method does not prove the implication [finite SO2 ⇒ finite
SO1], and that it does not prove the implication [finite SO2⇒ infinite SO1]
either, and we will argue, although we are unable to provide a strict formal
proof, that the finite SO2 does not entail even the finite SO1.
Henson’s formulates the causality principles SO1 and SO2 within a very
elaborate formal framework that links explicitly probabilistic concepts to
spatiotemporal notions. Section 2 recalls briefly this framework and some
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definitions needed to formulate the two causality principles SO1 and SO2,
which will be stated explicitly in Section 3 together with Henson’s proof of
their equivalence. Section 4 analyzes the equivalence proof and motivates
the distinction between finite and infinite versions of SO1 and SO2. Finally,
Section 5 discusses the problem of relation of the principles, arguing that
they are not equivalent.
2 Events, probabilities and least domain of decid-
ability
Henson creates a formal framework in order to relate probabilistic concepts
to spatiotemporal notions, the latter understood as including concepts of
non-probabilistic causality. Here we recall this framework following the no-
tations of [Hen05] closely.
Let S be some spacetime structure. Henson leaves the nature of S un-
specified except that he assumes a causal (partial) order < defined on S that
expresses causal precedence between elements x, y in S: if x < y then x is
in the causal past of y.1 Given (S, <) the past J−(x) of x ∈ X , is defined
as the set of all points that precedes x in the causal order, plus x itself, i.e.
J−(x) = {xp ∈ S : xp < x} ∪ {x}
The past of X ⊂ S is then defined [Hen05, p. 523] as the union of the
pasts of all points in the region:
J−(X ) =
⋃
x∈X
J−(x)
Given two regions X and Y in (S, <) one can define the following re-
gions:
Mutual past: P1(X ,Y ) = J
−(X ) ∩ J−(Y )
Joint past: J−(X ) ∪ J−(Y )
Truncated joint past: P2(X ,Y ) = (J
−(X ) ∪ J−(Y )) \ (X ∪ Y )
1Henson lists as examples of such causally ordered sets weakly causal Lorentzian man-
ifolds and causal sets [Hen05, p. 523]. Weakly causal Lorentzian manifolds are manifolds
that contain no causally closed curves; an example is the Minkowski spacetime. If the
causal partial order < defined in S is transitive, acyclic and locally finite, then S is called
a causal set. Causal sets so defined then constitute the discreet equivalent to spacetime
manifolds equipped with causal structure. (Discreetness is introduced by the locally finite
property of the order relation in a causal set, i.e. ∀x, z ∈ S, card{y ∈ S : x < y < z} < ∞.
See [Sor03] for details.)
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Note that the terminology in [Hen05] is slightly different: Henson calls the
truncated joint past P2(X ,Y ) “joint past” and does not define joint past
explicitly. We will use the terminology introduced above.
Two regions X and Y are defined to be space-like separated if
J−(X ) ∩ Y = ∅,
X ∩ J−(Y ) = ∅.
In the notations of [Hen05], a classical probability measure space is a
triplet (Ω,Σ, µ) where Ω is “the space of all possible histories of the system”
[Hen05, p. 521] to be described probabilistically, Σ is an “appropriate σ
algebra of subsets of Ω” [Hen05, p. 521] and µ : Σ → R is a probability
measure “obeying the usual axioms” [Hen05, p. 521]. The link between
(Ω,Σ, µ) and spatiotemporal concepts is given by a map
dom : Σ→ pow(S)
where pow(S) denotes the power set of S. The region dom(A) is called
the least domain of decidability of event A ∈ Σ – intuitively, dom(A) is
the unique spacetime region such that if we know all the properties of the
history in it we can decide, without any further information, whether A has
occurred or not.
The properties of dom are fixed axiomatically by formulating require-
ments that it should satisfy. Following [Hen05, p. 524] we list the axioms
below.
Properties of dom:
For all countable subsets Λ ⊂ Σ we have
(i) If dom(X) ∩ dom(Y ) = ∅ ∀X,Y ∈ Λ, such that X 6= Y then
dom(
⋂
X∈Λ
X) =
⊔
X∈Λ
dom(X)
where
⊔
stands for the ‘disjoint union’.
(ii) If dom(X) = dom(Y ) ∀X,Y ∈ Λ then
dom(
⋂
X∈Λ
X) ⊂ dom(Y ), ∀Y ∈ Λ.
(iii) dom(Xc) = dom(X), ∀X ∈ Σ.
(iv) ∀Z ∈ Σ such that dom(Z) = X ⊔ Y , Z is a member of the σ-algebra
generated by Γ(X )∪Γ(Y ), where Γ(X ) = {X ∈ Σ : dom(X) ⊂ X }.
A further notion that will be important in the discussion of the common
cause principle is the full specification of a region:
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Definition 1. Event F ∈ Σ is a full specification of a region R if dom(F ) ⊂
R, and for all X ∈ Σ it holds that, if dom(X) ⊂ R, then either F ⊂ X or
F ⊂ Xc.
Φ(R) denotes the set of full specifications of region R. Henson proves
the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Lemma 3 in [Hen05]). The full specification of any region
is a partition of Ω.
3 Two Common Cause Principles: SO1 and SO2
and the Equivalence Claim
The next definition of common cause was given by Reichenbach [Rei56] and
is standard in the literature.
Definition 2. Assume that A,B ∈ Σ are positively correlated in µ:
µ(A ∩B) > µ(A)µ(B) (1)
Event C ∈ Σ is a (Reichenbachian) common cause of the correlation (1) if
it satisfies the following conditions
µ(A ∩B|C) = µ(A|C)µ(B|C) (2)
µ(A ∩B|Cc) = µ(A|Cc)µ(B|Cc) (3)
µ(A ∩ C) > µ(A ∩ Cc) (4)
µ(B ∩ C) > µ(B ∩ Cc) (5)
Reichenbach also formulated what is called the
Common Cause Principle: If two events A,B are correlated then either
there is a direct causal link between A and B that is responsible for the
correlation, or, if A and B are causally independent, then there exists a
common cause that explains the correlation.
Viewed from the perspective of the Common Cause Principle, the defi-
nition of common cause (Definition 2) is incomplete for two reasons:
(i) The definition does not contain an explicit requirement about the
causal independence of A and B.
(ii) It is part of the intuition about the Common Cause Principle that the
common cause C should be an event that can causally affect events
A and B; however, there is no explicit expression of this type of non-
probabilistic causal link between C and A and C and B in the defini-
tion of common cause.
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How should one transform the two informal conditions (i) and (ii) above into
precise and technically explicit conditions in order to obtain a formulation
of the Common Cause Principle that can be formally analyzed? In our
view this is the deepest and most important problem in connection with
the Common Cause Principle, which lies at the heart of most of the debates
about the Common Cause Principle. It is here that Henson’s framework and
the notion of least domain of decidability offers a solution. Before recalling
how, we need to make two remarks about possible modifications of the notion
of common cause:
The first remark is that there are arguments in favor of weakening the
notion of common cause in the following sense: It is conceivable that a cor-
relation is due not to a single common cause but a whole set of “partial com-
mon causes”. This idea leads to the notion of common cause system, which
was analyzed in a number of publications (see [Uff99], [HSR04], [HSR06],
[WM10]). A common cause system is a partition {Ci : i ∈ I} of Ω such
that
µ(A ∩B|Ci) = µ(A|Ci)p(B|Ci) for all i ∈ I (6)
[µ(A|Ci)− µ(A|Cj)][µ(B|Ci)− µ(B|Cj)] > 0 (i 6= j) (7)
Equation (6) is called the screening-off condition, (7) is the analogue of the
statistical relevance conditions (4)-(5) (see [HSR04], [HSR06] for a further
motivation of condition (7)).
The second remark is that when it comes to proving that common causes
cannot exist for certain correlations, one would like to prove such “no-go”
theorems under the weakest conditions; hence, frequently the general sta-
tistical relevance condition (7) is dropped from the definition of common
cause system —this is what Henson also does in the formulation of the two
causality principles SO1 and SO2. These principles are as follows.
SO1. For all events A and B with dom(A) ⊂ A and dom(B) ⊂ B, if A
and B are space-like separated regions, then
µ(A ∩B|C) = µ(A|C)µ(B|C) ∀C ∈ Φ(P1(A ,B)). (8)
SO2. For all events A and B with dom(A) ⊂ A and dom(B) ⊂ B, if A
and B are space-like separated regions then:
µ(A ∩B|C) = µ(A|C)µ(B|C) ∀C ∈ Φ(P2(A ,B)). (9)
Some remarks on SO1 and SO2 are in order:
Remark 1.
(i) Note that the C’s referred to in SO1 and SO2 do form a partition
because they are full specifications of regions and these form a partition
by Proposition 1; hence both SO1 and SO2 state that correlations
between events with causally disjoint domains of decidability have a
common cause system.
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(ii) The fact that C’s are required to be full specifications in the respec-
tive regions entails (and thus is motivated by) the fact that this way
“Simpson events”, events that could re-introduce the correlation be-
tween A and B after they have been screened off by C’s, are excluded
(see [Hen05, p. 526-527] for a further discussion of the “Simpson prob-
lem”).
(iii) The two principles differ in which past they require the postulated
screening-off partition to be located: The first principle requires the
common cause system to lie in the mutual past of A and B: recall
that P1(A ,B) = J
−(A )∩ J−(B). The second principle requires the
common cause system to be localized in the truncated joint past of A
and B: P2(A ,B) = (J
−(A ) ∪ J−(B)) \ (A ∪B).
(iv) There is a deceptive dissimilarity in requiring the common cause sys-
tem in SO1 to be in the untruncated mutual past and to be in the
truncated joint past in SO2; however, since A and B are assumed to
space-like separated the untruncated and truncated mutual pasts of
A and B coincide; hence there is no need to require explicitly the
common cause system to be in the truncated mutual past. But one
has to do so explicitly in SO2 because, intuitively, we do not want
the common cause system to be in the regions where the correlated
events are. Requiring the common cause system to be in the truncated
mutual past excludes for instance the common cause system to be the
partition generated by A and B.
(v) The difference between the two localizability regions in SO1 and SO2
is that
- The mutual past is the set of points in S each of which is causally
related to at least one point in both A and B.
- The truncated joint past consist of the set of points in S none
of which is in either A or in B, and each of which is causally
related to at least one point in either A or B.
The description (v) above of the mutual and joint pasts indicates that
SO1 and SO2 are different: SO2 seems a weaker principle than SO1. Henson
claims however that SO1 and SO2 are equivalent (Corollary 2 in [Hen05]).
We now sketch the proof of this equivalence claim. In the proof the following
two regions X and Y will be referred to:
X =
[
J−(A )\A
]
\J−(B) (10)
Y =
[
J−(B)\B
]
\J−(A ) (11)
(I). Proof of SO1 ⇒ SO2
Assume SO1. Then for A and B such that dom(A) ⊂ A , dom(B) ⊂ B
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and A and B space-like separated we have:
µ(A ∩B|C) = µ(A|C)µ(B|C) ∀C ∈ Φ(P1(A ,B)), (12)
Let X and Y be full specifications of regions X and Y , respectively,
and consider the following four pairs of events
{(A ∩X), (B ∩ Y )} {(A ∩X), B} {A, (B ∩ Y )} {X,Y } (13)
It is easy to show that the two events in each of the above pairs occur
in regions {(A ∪X ), (B∪Y )}, which are space-like separated; on the
other hand the mutual past of (A ∪X ) and (B ∪ Y ) is equal to the
mutual past of A and B:
J−(A ∪X ) ∩ J−(B ∪ Y ) = J−(A ) ∩ J−(B)
Thus SO1 can be applied to each pair in eq. (13) and we obtain that
any full specification C of Φ(P1(A ,B)) screens off the correlation
between the elements in every of these pairs.
A probability Lemma [Hen05, Lemma 4, p. 528] is then invoked to
show that ∀X ∈ Φ(X ), ∀Y ∈ Φ(Y ) and C ∈ Φ(P1(A ,B)) the
following relation follows:
µ(A|X ∩ Y ∩ C)µ(B|X ∩ Y ∩ C) = µ(A ∩B|X ∩ Y ∩ C).
On the other hand, a full specification F of a region R defined as the
disjoint union of some finite set of regions Ai, i.e. R = ⊔iAi, can be
written as F = ∩iAi, where Ai is a full specification of Ai [Hen05,
Corollary 1, p. 525].
Then, sinceX, Y and C are full specifications of X , Y and Φ(P1(A ,B))
respectively, i.e. X ∈ Φ(X ), Y ∈ Φ(Y ) and C ∈ Φ(P1(A ,B)), and
since P2(A ,B) = X ⊔ Y ⊔P1, we have that
C ∩X ∩ Y ∈ Φ(P2(A ,B)).
It is concluded then that SO1 implies SO2.
(II). SO2 ⇒ SO1
Assume now SO2. Thus if A and B are such that dom(A) ⊂ A ,
dom(B) ⊂ B and A and B are spacelike separated. Then we have:
µ(A ∩B|C) = µ(A|C)µ(B|C) ∀C ∈ Φ(P2(A ,B))
Consider again the regions X and Y defined by eqs. (10)-(11).
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Now if dom(A) ⊂ A then we also have that dom(A) ⊂ (A ∪ X ).
Similarly if dom(B) ⊂ B then dom(B) ⊂ (B ∪ Y ). This means
that events A and B occur in regions {(A ∪X ), (B ∪ Y )} which, as
before, can be seen to be space-like separated. Thus we can apply SO2
to these two regions. If we calculate the truncated joint past of the
regions (A ∪X ) and (B ∪Y ) we find however that it coincides with
the mutual past of the regions A and B, i.e.
P2((A ∪X ), (B ∪ Y )) = P1(A ,B) (14)
This means that eq. (9) is the same as eq. (8); hence SO2 ⇒ SO1.
4 Finite and infinite SO1 and SO2
The equivalence of SO1 and SO2 does not seem to fit well with intuition:
Existence of an explanation of a correlation in terms of a common cause
system that is localized in the mutual past of the correlated events does
not seem to be a priori inferable from an explanation in terms of common
causes of which we only know that they are localized in the (truncated) joint
past, which is typically a larger region; yet, the equivalence, if holds, entails
that we are licensed to make such an inference. How can one reconcile the
equivalence claim with this intuition?
The proof of the equivalence claim shows that the following two condi-
tions are crucial in showing the equivalence:
Loose domain: The screening-off conditions (8)-(9) in SO1 and SO2 are
required not for the full specifications of the intersection and truncated
joint past of the least domains dom(A) and dom(B) of the correlated
events A and B but for the full specifications of the intersection and
truncated past of all spacelike separated regions A and B containing
the least domains dom(A) and dom(B), respectively.
Tricky regions: Because of the above Loose domain property of the prin-
ciples SO1 and SO2, in the proof SO2 ⇒ SO1 it is allowed that SO2
is applied to regions of the form (A ∪ X ) and (B ∪ Y ) that have
the peculiar property that their truncated joint past is equal to the
mutual past of A and B. This is achieved by taking X and Y as
defined by eqs. (10)-(11).
Henson himself notes [Hen05, p. 527] that the Loose domain property
is somewhat unnatural and needs justification because the natural condi-
tion would be to require the screening-off conditions (8)-(9) to hold for the
full specifications of the intersection and truncated joint past of the least
domains of decidability dom(A) and dom(B) of the correlated events A and
B, not for the full specifications of all regions A and B containing the least
9
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P1(A ,B)
YX
A B
Figure 1: The truncated joint past of (A ∪X ) and (B ∪Y ) is equal to the
mutual past of A and B
domains of decidability. The argument Henson provides for the justifica-
tion is that if one requires the screening-off conditions for disjoint events Ai
all having least domain of decidability to be equal to A then this entails
(by the properties of the least domain of decidability function dom) that
the screening-off conditions hold for events of the form A = ∪Ai and these
events have their least domain of decidability just contained but not nec-
essarily equal to A . Henson points out that such a justification “... can
always be constructed for any A ⊃ dom(A) as long as there are events with
A as their least domain of decidability”[Hen05, p. 527] (our emphasis).
In particular such a justification is needed in case of the tricky domains
(A ∪X ) and (B ∪ Y ) that feature in the proof of the equivalence claims
because these regions are strictly larger than the least domains of decid-
ability A and B. Note however that the regions (A ∪ X ) and (B ∪ Y )
are in a sense causally very large. For a typical example, take S to be the
Minkowski spacetime M : Let A and B be two spacelike separated dou-
ble cones. Then J−(A ) \ A is the infinitely large region of the full causal
past of the double cone A minus the finite double cone subtracted from it,
and (J−(A ) \A ) \ J−(B) is the also infinitely large strip that remains of
J−(A ) \A after subtracting from it the full past of B. It is then clear why
the truncated joint past of (A ∪ X ) and (B ∪ Y ) is equal to the mutual
past of the double cones A and B (see Fig. 1).
Adjectives “finite” and “infinite” in the previous sentences are used in
the sense of a metric, which is available in Minkowski spacetime: a double
cone A is finite in the sense of the metric, (J−(A )\A )\J−(B) is not. But
a metric is not assumed to be part of a general causal set, so finiteness and
infiniteness cannot be defined in metric terms. On the basis of the example of
double cones in Minkowski spacetime one can however formulate, in terms of
the causal order only, what is important: subtracting a double cone from its
causal past is nonempty; in addition, a double cone is causally closed in the
sense of being equal to its causal closure, where causal closure of a spacetime
region O is, by definition, the set (O′)′ whereO′, the causal complement of O,
is the set of points in the Minkowski spacetime that are spacelike from every
10
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point in O. Furthermore, every bounded region A in Minkowski spacetime
is contained in a double cone, the smallest of such double cones is equal
to the causal closure of A . The notion of causal complement and causal
closure makes perfect sense in any causal set S in place of the Minkowski
spacetime, and all this motivates the following definition.
Definition 3. A region A in S is called causally finite if the causal past of
its causal closure (denoted by A¯ ) is strictly larger than itself, i.e. if it holds
that
J−(A¯ ) \ A¯ 6= ∅ (15)
The region is called causally infinite if it is not causally finite.
As the case of Minkowski spacetime indicates the regions (A ∪X ) and
(B ∪ Y ) can be causally infinite in the sense of the above definition and
since SO1 and SO2 are applied to them, Henson’s justification why this is
conceptually admissible needs to be invoked, which, as we saw, assumes that
there are events with (A ∪X ) and (B∪Y ) as least domains of decidability.
Causally finite and causally infinite regions are conceptually very different
however if considered as least domains of decidability: an event whose least
domain of decidability is equal to a causally infinite set Z is only compre-
hendible by taking into account the complete causal structure of the region
Z . This whole region might very well be empirically inaccessible in its
entirety however (think of the case of the double cones in Minkowski space-
time); hence one might not be in the position to decide empirically whether
such an event has happened or not. In particular, observing a correlation
involving such an event might very well be problematic.
Thus it is conceptually well-motivated to distinguish two versions of both
SO1 and SO2: the original ones, in which no restrictions are imposed on the
regions, call these principles infinite SO1 and infinite SO2, and ones in which
A and B are restricted to causally finite regions:
Finite SO1. For all events A and B with dom(A) ⊂ A and dom(B) ⊂ B,
if A and B are causally finite space-like separated regions, then
µ(A ∩B|C) = µ(A|C)µ(B|C) ∀C ∈ Φ(P1(A ,B)). (16)
Finite SO2. For all events A and B with dom(A) ⊂ A and dom(B) ⊂ B,
if A and B are causally finite space-like separated regions then:
µ(A ∩B|C) = µ(A|C)µ(B|C) ∀C ∈ Φ(P2(A ,B)). (17)
5 Are the four causality principles equivalent?
What is the relation of the four causality principles finite and infinite SO1
and finite and infinite SO2?
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(⇓)
FinSO1
⇒
⇒
Inf SO1
⇑
Inf SO2
(:)
(:)
(⇓)
FinSO2
⇑?
Figure 2: Logical relations between the diverse screening-off principles. Re-
lations in parenthesis are considered as likely to hold, although no complete
formal proof has been found. A question mark indicates that the corre-
sponding logical relation is not known.
As we recalled in Section 3, Henson has shown that infinite SO2 entails
infinite SO1. As the example of double cones in Minkowski space shows, the
region (A ∪X ), where X is defined by eq. (10), may not be causally finite
even if both A and B are. Consequently, the proof presented in Section 3 of
the implication infinite SO2⇒ infinite SO1, which relies in a crucial way on
applying SO2 to regions of the form (A ∪X ), does not prove the implication
finite SO2⇒ infinite SO1, not even the implication finite SO2⇒ finite SO1.
What Henson’s argument in Section 3 in favor of the implication SO1
⇒ SO2 shows, strictly speaking, is that, given any pair A,B, and C ∈
Φ(P1(A ,B)) satisfying (8), there is always a C
′ ∈ P2(A ,B) (namely
C ′ = C ∩X ∩ Y ) such that A, B and C ′ satisfy the condition required by
SO2. This does not yield yet that SO1 entails SO2, however: in order to
infer this, one needs to show that these C ′ ∈ P2(A ,B) events exhaust the
set Φ(P2(A ,B)) of all possible full specifications of P2(A ,B) – and it
remains unclear why this is the case, especially in case of causally infinite
least domains of decidability. Thus we regard the problem of whether the
implication [(finite or infinite) SO1 ⇒ (finite or infinite) SO2] as open but
likely true and intuitively plausible.
The implications [infinite SO1 ⇒ finite SO1] and [infinite SO2 ⇒ finite
SO2] are trivial. The diagram in Fig. 2 summarizes the logical relations
known between these causality principles at this time, question marks indi-
cating open problems.
The truth of the claim formulated above that Henson’s proof in Section 3
of the implication [infinite SO2 ⇒ infinite SO1] does not prove either of the
implications [finite SO2 ⇒ infinite SO1] or [finite SO2 ⇒ finite SO1] does
not entail that none of these implications is true, and we do not have a
12
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formal proof that these implications do not hold. But the analysis in local
algebraic relativistic quantum field theory (AQFT) of the status of SO1 and
SO2 yields a strong argument that finite SO2 is strictly weaker than infinite
SO2. So we conclude by commenting on the status of the causality principles
SO1 and SO2 in local algebraic relativistic quantum field theory (AQFT).
It was shown in [RS02], [RS07] (see also [Re´d97], chapter in [Re´d98] and
[Re´d02]) that if AQFT satisfies the condition of local primitive causality,
then finite SO2 holds in AQFT in the specific sense that there is a single
common cause of spacelike correlations predicted by faithful states between
projections contained in algebras pertaining to spacelike separated double
cones and the common cause is localized in the truncated joint past of the
backward light cones of the double cones containing the correlated projec-
tions (Proposition 3 in [RS02]). This fact was referred to by saying that
AQFT satisfies the weak common cause principle. It could not be proved
so far however that AQFT also satisfies (even the finite) SO1. In view of
the distinctions made here between finite and infinite versions of SO1 and
SO2, it is instructive to see why the proof in [RS02] of the claim that AQFT
satisfies the weak common cause principle is too weak to prove that infinite
SO2 holds in AQFT, because the proof shows how radically different finite
and infinite versions of SO2 and SO1 can be.
The proof of finite SO2 in AQFT consists of the following steps:
step 1 One shows, utilizing the special type of the local algebras pertaining
to double cones that the probability theories describing the observables
represented by these algebras have the particular measure theoretic
feature of being atomless.
step 2 One proves that atomlessness entails that there exists a projection
in the smallest double cone C containing the double cones A and
B which satisfies the probabilistic conditions required of a common
cause.
step 3 Using the local primitive causality condition one “pushes back” the
common cause in C far enough back in the joint causal past of A and
B until it is in the truncated joint past of A and B.
(Recall that the local primitive causality condition states that the local
algebra A(V ) of observables associated with an open bounded spacetime
region V is equal to the local algebra of observables A(V¯ ) where V¯ is the
causal closure of V .)
This proof cannot be extended to conclude that infinite SO2 also holds
in AQFT, for the following reasons:
- While it could be proved that local algebras associated to double cone
regions have the measure theoretic atomlessness as a consequence of
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such algebras being type III von Neumann algebras, this latter alge-
braic feature is only known to hold in AQFT for algebras pertaining to
special spacetime regions and hence cannot be assumed for arbitrary
regions such as (10)-(11). That is to say, already step 1 is not known
to be valid for arbitrary, in particular causally infinite, regions.
Moral: the type of measure space describing events may very well
restrict the possible shapes of regions that are least domains of decid-
ability for the events in the probability space.
- Step 3 only works because double cones are causally finite (in the sense
of Definition 3): Even if we could make step 1 for regions A ∪ X
and B ∪ Y and did find a common cause in the untruncated joint
past of A ∪X and B ∪ Y (X and Y defined by (10) and (11)), we
would not be able to “push back” this common cause far enough in
the untruncated joint past of A ∪X so that it gets in the truncated
joint past of A ∪X and B ∪Y – precisely because these regions are
causally infinite and thus there is no open bounded (hence causally
finite) region V having the property that its causal closure V¯ is equal
to the untruncated joint past of A ∪X and B ∪ Y .
Thus the situation in AQFT indicates that finite and infinite SO2 are not
equivalent and thus that the logical relationships among these different
causality principles is a very subtle and complicated matter, clarification
of their relation requiring further work.
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